One thing that stands out to me is Russia's apparent investigative/surveillance success here. Russia isn't exactly renowned for its top-tier, Sherlock-level investigative prowess in the open-source or traditional sense. Yet, if the theory holds (and the geolocation of Unit 29155 operatives like Averyanov in places like Tbilisi and Frankfurt aligns with attacks), they somehow managed to identify and target a significant number of U.S. operatives tied to operations in/against Russia or Ukraine. Sure, picking off one or two CIA officers through luck or basic intel might be plausible—but with reports of over 1,000 anomalous health incidents (AHIs) across the globe (though not all confirmed as attacks), and a notable cluster involving people with Russia/Ukraine expertise, it raises questions. How did they get such precise targeting info on so many personnel? It suggests they might have had high-level insider access—perhaps a mole or compromised source deep inside U.S. intelligence or related circles—to pull names, locations, and travel details.
The global spread also seems odd under the "Russian operatives with a portable weapon" scenario. Incidents popped up not just in adversarial spots like Cuba or even Russia itself, but in NATO-friendly/allied countries like the UK, Germany, Austria (Vienna cluster), Poland, etc. How do you smuggle or deploy a directed-energy device (backpack-sized or otherwise) through customs/airports/security in those places without detection? One possibility is diplomatic channels: embassies enjoy strong protections under the Vienna Convention—diplomatic bags and pouches are generally immune from search/seizure as long as they're properly marked, and couriers have immunity too. We've seen historical cases of smuggling via diplomatic pouches (weapons, contraband, etc.). Could the device have been brought in through Russian embassies/consulates under official cover, then handed off to operatives? That would explain the reach without constant customs risks. Or was it so well disguised that it passes off as a harmless item—it's described as portable and backpack-sized?
You discussed Havana Syndrome and the CNN report on the US acquiring a direct-energy weapon for testing purposes (under the late Biden administration). But you did not mention the recent rumours (NY Post 10 Jan.; Forbes 13 Jan.)) that the US used some kind of sonic weapon in Venezuela to disarm temporarily the security guards around Maduro to enable his seizure. My question about that possibility was that the effect of the directed-energy weapons described to date as 'Havana syndrome' was not an immediate, quick disabling but more long-term impact such as vertigo, headaches, sight, etc. So is this plausible, and if so, would it have been this, a similar or different device?
Michael raises a key question: If these attacks are attributed to Russia, does that make them an act of war? I'd argue yes—deliberately harming U.S. personnel abroad with a directed-energy weapon crosses that line, especially given the scale and targeting.
This isn't the first time Russia has targeted Americans without repercussions under Trump. Remember the 2020 U.S. intelligence reports that Russia (via GRU Unit 29155, the same outfit tied to AHI) was paying bounties to the Taliban to kill U.S. forces in Afghanistan? Trump dismissed it as a "hoax," but Michael Weiss's investigative reporting for The Insider proved it was very real: Evidence from intercepts, detainee interrogations, leaked GRU emails, and financial trails showed payments of ~$200K per killed American, totaling ~$30M, escalating from 2016 onward. (Report: https://theins.ru/en/politics/277723)
Trump's softness on Russia is well-documented—he attacks Ukraine, the victim, blaming them at least six times for starting the war and four times for being the main impediment to peace, when the global consensus (on the side of good) knows Russia is the aggressor. Even if AHI is deemed an act of war, Trump would likely just appease Putin. All he talks about is doing business with Russia, which is bizarre: Pre-2022 full-scale invasion, U.S.-Russia bilateral trade was only about $35 billion annually, dwarfed by U.S.-EU trade at ~$1.3 trillion. Yet since Trump's return to office in 2025, his tariffs and policies have caused U.S.-EU trade to plummet by hundreds of billions (estimates suggest up to $500B in disruptions), creating economic chaos while he chases deals with a minor partner like Russia.
This pattern of U.S. presidents being soft on Russia isn't new—it's a bipartisan failing. George W. Bush infamously said after his 2001 summit with Putin: "I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul."
Obama pursued his 2009 "reset" policy to thaw relations, complete with Hillary Clinton's symbolic button, and in a 2012 hot-mic moment told Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, "This is my last election. After my election I have more flexibility" on missile defense issues. Then, after Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and invasion of Donbas, Obama refused to provide Ukraine with lethal aid
Biden was the first to really show resolve by confronting Russia head-on after the 2022 full-scale invasion, authorizing over $60 billion in aid and rallying NATO allies. But even he didn't go far enough, drip-feeding weapons to Ukraine due to fears of crossing Putin's so-called "red lines." Ukraine would request systems like HIMARS, Abrams tanks, ATACMS missiles, and F-16 jets; the U.S. would initially say no to avoid provoking Russia, then approve them months later after thousands of Ukrainian soldiers had died or gone missing—only for Putin to do nothing in response. If Ukraine had been properly armed from the start without these hesitations, the war might have ended much sooner. As for the 2023 counteroffensive, that was a disaster from the start—NATO advising Ukraine to fight like a NATO member without NATO's number-one asset: fast-air (jets/air superiority). Without it, combined-arms maneuvers against deep Russian minefields and fortifications were doomed, leading to heavy losses and minimal gains.
Now, under Trump and his Russia fixation, it's even worse: Aid has been paused or cut, and intelligence sharing was halted during Ukraine's 2024 Kursk offensive, leading to heavy Ukrainian losses. Sure, Biden did more than any president before or after him, but his caution still cost lives. If AHI gets pinned on Russia as an act of war, don't expect Trump to do anything but appease—after all, he's more focused on "doing business" with them than standing up to aggression.
A very articulate and informed overview. I learned much. One question - he mentioned something about the device fitting in a backpack and that this was significant, but he did not circle back to it - what was the importance of the backpack ? Thank you.
Michael. I'm John Liccione (Li-chee-oh-nee), founder/CEO of RussiLeaks (Russileaks.com) and was a 2024 candidate for Congress in FL's 13th District. We need to talk about this via secure comms. I just sent you a DM message via your website contact form with some details. "michaelweissjournalist.com/contact". Urgent.
Hey John, congrats on 'running' for FL-13... but 3.9% in a wide-open Democratic primary isn't exactly storming the gates. Reminder: literally any registered Democrat who's been in the party for a year and can scrape together the fee (or petitions) can slap 'candidate' on their bio. Even a crackhead could do it—no shade, just facts. This isn't some elite achievement; it's like bragging about having a business card anyone can print at Kinko's.
To skip the $10,440 qualifying fee, you’d have needed 5,591 petition signatures from voters in the district. Anyone who signs is putting in real effort and almost certainly voting for you (especially if they're Dems). Yet you only mustered 2,013 votes total… meaning your fanbase couldn't even hit half the petition bar.
So instead of rallying a grassroots crew, you dropped $10k cash just to get on the ballot. That’s ~$5.19 per vote. Solid ROI for a 'tech executive' bio line.
Nice work. Another project idea for the Insider is « the Trump ~Putin connection, what does Putin know about Trump that Trump doesn’t want public
Here is a blog on Moscow Microwaves (focusing on my personal experience), and the related phenomenon of Havana Syndrome. https://shoeone.blogspot.com/2013/09/moscow-microwaves.html
One thing that stands out to me is Russia's apparent investigative/surveillance success here. Russia isn't exactly renowned for its top-tier, Sherlock-level investigative prowess in the open-source or traditional sense. Yet, if the theory holds (and the geolocation of Unit 29155 operatives like Averyanov in places like Tbilisi and Frankfurt aligns with attacks), they somehow managed to identify and target a significant number of U.S. operatives tied to operations in/against Russia or Ukraine. Sure, picking off one or two CIA officers through luck or basic intel might be plausible—but with reports of over 1,000 anomalous health incidents (AHIs) across the globe (though not all confirmed as attacks), and a notable cluster involving people with Russia/Ukraine expertise, it raises questions. How did they get such precise targeting info on so many personnel? It suggests they might have had high-level insider access—perhaps a mole or compromised source deep inside U.S. intelligence or related circles—to pull names, locations, and travel details.
The global spread also seems odd under the "Russian operatives with a portable weapon" scenario. Incidents popped up not just in adversarial spots like Cuba or even Russia itself, but in NATO-friendly/allied countries like the UK, Germany, Austria (Vienna cluster), Poland, etc. How do you smuggle or deploy a directed-energy device (backpack-sized or otherwise) through customs/airports/security in those places without detection? One possibility is diplomatic channels: embassies enjoy strong protections under the Vienna Convention—diplomatic bags and pouches are generally immune from search/seizure as long as they're properly marked, and couriers have immunity too. We've seen historical cases of smuggling via diplomatic pouches (weapons, contraband, etc.). Could the device have been brought in through Russian embassies/consulates under official cover, then handed off to operatives? That would explain the reach without constant customs risks. Or was it so well disguised that it passes off as a harmless item—it's described as portable and backpack-sized?
Another affirmation of the reality of Havana Syndrome/AHI. Yet, at no point civilian victims are even considered. See Report: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/398931431
I'm sorry, but why should we trust anything coming out of the ODNI at this point?
You discussed Havana Syndrome and the CNN report on the US acquiring a direct-energy weapon for testing purposes (under the late Biden administration). But you did not mention the recent rumours (NY Post 10 Jan.; Forbes 13 Jan.)) that the US used some kind of sonic weapon in Venezuela to disarm temporarily the security guards around Maduro to enable his seizure. My question about that possibility was that the effect of the directed-energy weapons described to date as 'Havana syndrome' was not an immediate, quick disabling but more long-term impact such as vertigo, headaches, sight, etc. So is this plausible, and if so, would it have been this, a similar or different device?
Michael raises a key question: If these attacks are attributed to Russia, does that make them an act of war? I'd argue yes—deliberately harming U.S. personnel abroad with a directed-energy weapon crosses that line, especially given the scale and targeting.
This isn't the first time Russia has targeted Americans without repercussions under Trump. Remember the 2020 U.S. intelligence reports that Russia (via GRU Unit 29155, the same outfit tied to AHI) was paying bounties to the Taliban to kill U.S. forces in Afghanistan? Trump dismissed it as a "hoax," but Michael Weiss's investigative reporting for The Insider proved it was very real: Evidence from intercepts, detainee interrogations, leaked GRU emails, and financial trails showed payments of ~$200K per killed American, totaling ~$30M, escalating from 2016 onward. (Report: https://theins.ru/en/politics/277723)
Trump's softness on Russia is well-documented—he attacks Ukraine, the victim, blaming them at least six times for starting the war and four times for being the main impediment to peace, when the global consensus (on the side of good) knows Russia is the aggressor. Even if AHI is deemed an act of war, Trump would likely just appease Putin. All he talks about is doing business with Russia, which is bizarre: Pre-2022 full-scale invasion, U.S.-Russia bilateral trade was only about $35 billion annually, dwarfed by U.S.-EU trade at ~$1.3 trillion. Yet since Trump's return to office in 2025, his tariffs and policies have caused U.S.-EU trade to plummet by hundreds of billions (estimates suggest up to $500B in disruptions), creating economic chaos while he chases deals with a minor partner like Russia.
This pattern of U.S. presidents being soft on Russia isn't new—it's a bipartisan failing. George W. Bush infamously said after his 2001 summit with Putin: "I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul."
Obama pursued his 2009 "reset" policy to thaw relations, complete with Hillary Clinton's symbolic button, and in a 2012 hot-mic moment told Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, "This is my last election. After my election I have more flexibility" on missile defense issues. Then, after Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and invasion of Donbas, Obama refused to provide Ukraine with lethal aid
Biden was the first to really show resolve by confronting Russia head-on after the 2022 full-scale invasion, authorizing over $60 billion in aid and rallying NATO allies. But even he didn't go far enough, drip-feeding weapons to Ukraine due to fears of crossing Putin's so-called "red lines." Ukraine would request systems like HIMARS, Abrams tanks, ATACMS missiles, and F-16 jets; the U.S. would initially say no to avoid provoking Russia, then approve them months later after thousands of Ukrainian soldiers had died or gone missing—only for Putin to do nothing in response. If Ukraine had been properly armed from the start without these hesitations, the war might have ended much sooner. As for the 2023 counteroffensive, that was a disaster from the start—NATO advising Ukraine to fight like a NATO member without NATO's number-one asset: fast-air (jets/air superiority). Without it, combined-arms maneuvers against deep Russian minefields and fortifications were doomed, leading to heavy losses and minimal gains.
Now, under Trump and his Russia fixation, it's even worse: Aid has been paused or cut, and intelligence sharing was halted during Ukraine's 2024 Kursk offensive, leading to heavy Ukrainian losses. Sure, Biden did more than any president before or after him, but his caution still cost lives. If AHI gets pinned on Russia as an act of war, don't expect Trump to do anything but appease—after all, he's more focused on "doing business" with them than standing up to aggression.
A very articulate and informed overview. I learned much. One question - he mentioned something about the device fitting in a backpack and that this was significant, but he did not circle back to it - what was the importance of the backpack ? Thank you.
Michael. I'm John Liccione (Li-chee-oh-nee), founder/CEO of RussiLeaks (Russileaks.com) and was a 2024 candidate for Congress in FL's 13th District. We need to talk about this via secure comms. I just sent you a DM message via your website contact form with some details. "michaelweissjournalist.com/contact". Urgent.
Hey John, congrats on 'running' for FL-13... but 3.9% in a wide-open Democratic primary isn't exactly storming the gates. Reminder: literally any registered Democrat who's been in the party for a year and can scrape together the fee (or petitions) can slap 'candidate' on their bio. Even a crackhead could do it—no shade, just facts. This isn't some elite achievement; it's like bragging about having a business card anyone can print at Kinko's.
To skip the $10,440 qualifying fee, you’d have needed 5,591 petition signatures from voters in the district. Anyone who signs is putting in real effort and almost certainly voting for you (especially if they're Dems). Yet you only mustered 2,013 votes total… meaning your fanbase couldn't even hit half the petition bar.
So instead of rallying a grassroots crew, you dropped $10k cash just to get on the ballot. That’s ~$5.19 per vote. Solid ROI for a 'tech executive' bio line.
the fact he feels like he needs to spell out his surname speaks volumes by itself.